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Combat Operations
Tasimboko (1-1 p11-13)
As August progressed the Japanese moved a steady stream of reinforcements
to Guadalcanal in nightly runs by destroyers and barges, a process soon
dubbed the "Tokyo Express" The Marines repulsed the first enemy attack
at the Tenaru River on 21 August, but Vandegrift knew that he would need
all the strength he could muster to defend the extended perimeter surrounding
the airfield. At the end of the month he brought the raiders and parachutists
across the sound and placed them in reserve near Lunga Point. The latter
battalion had suffered heavily in its assault on Gavutu-Tanambogo, to
include the loss of its commander, so Vandegrift attached the parachutists
to Red Mike's force.
Edson quickly established a rapport with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas,
the division operations Officer, and convinced him to use the raiders
offensively. The first product of this effort was a two-company patrol
on 4 September to Savo Island where intelligence believed the enemy had
an observation post. While Griffith commanded that operation, Red Mike
planned a reconnaissance-in-force against Cape Esperance for the next
day. When the Savo patrol returned in the late afternoon on Little (APD
4) and Gregory (APD 3), the men began debarking before they received the
order to remain on board in preparation for the next mission. Once he
became aware of the mixup, Edson let the offload process proceed to completion.
That night Japanese destroyers of the Tokyo Express sank the two APDS.
It was thesecond close escape for the raiders. During the shift to Guadalcanal,
enemy planes had sunk the Colhoun (APD 2) just after it had unloaded a
company.
Marine attention soon shifted from Cape Esperance as it became evident
that the primary terminus of the Tokyo Express was the village of Tasimboko.
On 6 September Edson and Thomas won permission from Vandegrift to raid
the area on the eighth. After the loss of three of their APDS, shipping
was at a premium, so the raiders boarded the McKean (APD 5), Manley (APD
1), and two converted tuna boats for the operation. The raider rifle companies
would comprise the first echelon; the ships then would shuttle back to
the Lunga for the weapons company and the parachutists. Native scouts
reported there were several thousand Japanese in the area, but division
planners discounted that figure. However, Edson did rely on their reports
that the enemy defenses faced west toward Marine lines. He decided to
land beyond the village at Taivu Point and then advance overland to take
the target from the rear.
When the raiders went ashore just prior to dawn on 8 September, they
quickly realized the scouting reports had been accurate. As they moved
along the coast toward Tasimboko, they discovered more than a thousand
life preservers placed in neat rows, a large number of foxholes, and even
several unattended 37mm antitank guns. In previous days Major General
Kiyotaki Kawaguchi had landed an entire brigade at Tasimboko but it was
then advancing inland. Only a rearguard of about 300 men secured the village
and the Japanese supply dumps located there, though this force was nearly
as big as the raider first echelon. The Marines soon ran into stubborn
resistance, to include 75mm artillery pieces firing pointblank down the
coastal road and the orderly rows of a coconut plantation. While Edson
fixed the attention ofthe defenders with two companies, he sent Griffith
and Company A wide to the left flank.
Concerned that he might be facing the enemy main force, Red Mike radioed
a plea for a supplemental landing to the west of Tasimboko.The last part
of the message indicated there was trouble: "If not, request instructions
regarding my embarkation." Forty-five minutes later Edson again asked
for fresh troops and for more air support. Division responded the same
way each time - the raiders were to break off the action and withdraw.
Red Mike ignored that order and continued the attack. Not long afterwards,
enemy resistance melted away, and both wings of the raider force entered
the village around noon. The area was stockpiled with large quantities
of food, ammunition, and weapons rangingup to 75mm artillery pieces. Vandegrift
radioed a "well done" and repeated his order to withdraw yet again.
The raider commander chose to stay put for the time being, and his men
set about destroying as much of the cache as they could. Troops wrecked
a powerful radio station, bayoneted cans of food, tore open bags of rice
and urinated on the contents or spilled them on the ground, tied guns
to landing boats and towed them into deep water, and then finally put
the torch to everything that was left. They also gathered all available
documents. As the sun went down, the men reembarked and headed for the
perimeter, many ofthem a little bit heavier with liberated chow, cigarettes,
and alcohol.
The raid was a minor tactical victory in terms of actual fighting. The
Marines counted 27 enemy bodies and estimated they had killed 50. Their
own losses were two dead and six wounded. But the battle had important
repercussions. The raiders had put a serious dent in Japanese logistics,
fire support, and communications. The intelligence gathered had more far-reaching
consequences, since it revealed many of the details of the coming Japanese
offensive. Finally, the setback hurt the enemy's morale and further boosted
that of the raiders. They had defeated the Japanese yet again, and were
literally feasting on the fruits of the victory.
Leatherneck Magazine article on
Tasimboko (August 2009)
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