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Combat Operations
Tulagi (1-1 pp9-11)
The Makin operation had not been Nimitz's first choice for an amphibious
raid. In late May he had proposed an attack by the 1st Raiders against
the Japanese seaplane base on Tulagi, in the lower Solomon Islands. The
target was in the Southwest Pacific Area, however, and General Douglas
MacArthur opposed the plan. But Tulagi remained a significant threat to
the maritime lifeline to Australia. After the Midway victory opened the
door for a more offensive Allied posture, the Japanese advance positions
in the Solomons became a priority objective. In late June the Joint Chiefs
of Staff shifted that region from MacArthur's command to Nimitz's Pacific
Ocean Areas command, and ordered the seizure of Tulagi. The Americans
soon discovered that the Japanese were building an airfield on nearby
Guadalcanal, and that became the primary target for Operation Watchtower.
The 1st Marine Division, with the 1St Raider Battalion attached, received
the assignment.
In answer to Edson's repeated requests, the rear echelon of his battalion
(less the 81mm mortar platoon) finally joined up with him on 3 July in
Samoa. The entire unit then moved on to New Caledonia. The 1st Raiders
received definitive word on Watchtower on 20 July. They would seize Tulagi,
with the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, in support. The 1st Parachute Battalion
would take the conjoined islets of Gavutu-Tanambogo. The 1st Marine Division,
less one regiment in reserve, would capture the incomplete airfield on
Guadalcanal.
Edson offered to make amphibious reconnaissance patrols of the objectives,
but the naval commander rejected that idea. Most of the information on
Tulagi would come from three Australians, all former colonial officials
familiar with the area. Tulagi was 4,000 yards long and no more than 1,000
yards wide, and a high ridge ran along its length, except for a low, open
saddle near the southeast end. The only suitable landing beaches from
a hydrographic standpoint were those on either side of this low ground,
since coral formations fringed the rest of the island. Intelligence officers
estimated that the island held several hundred men of the Japanese Special
Naval Landing Force; these were elite troops of proven fighting ability.
Aerial reconnaissance indicated they were dug in to defend the obvious
landing sites. Planners thus chose to make the assault halfway up the
western coast at a place designated as Beach Blue. They wisely decided
to make the first American amphibious assault of the war against natural
obstacles, not enemy gunfire.
The raiders sailed from New Caledonia on 23 July and joined up with
the main task force for rehearsals on Koro Island in the Fijis. These
went poorly, since the Navy boat crews and most of the 1st Marine Division
were too green. On the morning of 7 August the task force hove to and
commenced unloading in what would become known as Iron-bottom Sound. Although
Edson's men had trained hard on their rubber boats, they would make this
landing from Higgins boats. After a preliminary bombardment by a cruiser
and destroyer, the first wave, composed of Companies B and D, headed for
shore. Coral forced them to debark and wade the last 100 yards, but there
was no enemy opposition. Companies A and C quickly followed them. The
four rifle companies spread out across the waist of the island and then
advanced in line to the southeast. They met only occasional sniper fire
until they reached Phase Line A at the end of the ridge, where they halted
as planned while naval guns fired an additional preparation on the enemy
defenses.
The attack jumped off again just before noon, and promptly ran into
heavy Japanese resistance. For the remainder of the day the raiders fought
to gain control of the saddle from the entrenched enemy, who would not
surrender under any circumstances. The Marines quickly discovered that
their only recourse was to employ explosives to destroy the men occupying
the caves and bunkers. As evening approached, the battalion settled into
defensive lines that circled the small ridge (Hill 281) on the tip of
the island. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, had already scoured the remainder
of the island and now took up positions in the rear of the raiders.
The Japanese launched their classic banzai counterattack at 2200 that
night. The initial effort punched a small hole in the raider lines between
Companies A and C. A second assault, which might have exploited this gap,
instead struck full against Company As front. This time the raiders held
their ground. For the remainder of the night the Japanese relied on infiltration
tactics, with individuals and small groups trying to make their way into
the American rear by stealth. By this means they attacked both the 2d
Battalion's command post (CP) and the aid station set up near Blue Beach.
They also came within 50 yards of the raider CP. Edson tried to call for
reinforcements, but communications were out.
In the morning things looked much better, just as they had on Makin.
At 0900 two companies of the 5th Marines passed through raider lines and
swept over the southern portions of Hill 281. The remaining enemy were
now isolated in a ravine in the midst of the small ridge. After a lengthy
barrage by the 60mm mortars of Company E and their heavier 81mm cousins
of the rifle battalion, infantrymen from both outfits moved through the
final enemy pocket. Grenades and dynamite were the weapons of choice against
the Japanese still holed up in their caves and dugouts. At 1500 Edson
declared the island secured. That did not mean the fighting was entirely
over. For the next few days Marines scoured the island by day, and fended
off occasional infiltrators at night, until they had killed off the last
enemy soldier. In the entire battle, the Raiders suffered losses of 38
dead and 55 wounded. There were an additional 33 casualties among other
Marine units on the island. All but three of the 350 Japanese defenders
had died.
On the night of 8 August a Japanese surface force arrived from Rabaul
and surprised the Allied naval forces guarding the transports. In a brief
engagement the enemy sank four cruisers and a destroyer, damaged other
ships, and killed 1,200 sailors, all at minimal cost to themselves. The
American naval commander had little choice the next morning but to order
the early withdrawal of his force. Most of the transports would depart
that afternoon with their cargo holds still half full. The raiders were
in a particularly bad way. They had come ashore with little food because
the plan called for their immediate withdrawal after seizing the island.
Moreover, since they had not cleared the enemy from the only usable beaches
until D plus 1, there had been little time to unload anything. The result
would be short rations for some time to come.
The 1St Raiders performed well in their initial exposure to combat.
Like their compatriots in the 2d Raiders, they were both brave and daring.
Major Kenneth D. Bailey demonstrated the type of leadership that was common
to both units. When an enemy machine gun held up the advance of his company
on D-day, he personally circled around the bunker,crawled on top, and
pushed a grenade into the firing port. In the process he received a gunshot
wound in the thigh. Edson established his reputation for fearlessness
by spending most of his time in the front lines, where he contemptuously
stood up in the face of enemy fire. More important, he aggressively employed
his force in battle, while many other senior commanders had grown timid
after years of peacetime service. Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift,
commander of the 1st Marine Division, soon wrote Commandant Holcomb that
"Edson is one of the finest troop leaders
I ever saw"
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